Cognizing an Object’s Universal Features for Its Identity

A Contemporary Debate between Nyāya and Buddhism

Abstract

In everyday life, people cognize many objects. A question thus arises, how do we cognize an object? Do we cognize and identify an object through its observable (secondary) or universal (primary) features? According to the Nyāya School, we cognize an object through its “universal features”, as they manifest in each constituent of the object. Due to these universal features, we identify an object with a name. Further, Naiyāyikas said that when we cognize an object, our cognition will not be regarded as determinate cognition if we do not identify it with a name. The reason is a determinate cognition necessarily requires cognition of an object’s universal features and identification of an object with a name. Further, it possesses the conceptual construction of the object. In contrast to the Nyāya School, Buddhism argues that a determinate cognition need not require cognition of an object’s universal features and conceptual construction of the object. This is because people cognize objects through their observable features, not through universal features, and the latter are not identified and referred to through sense organs. Against this backdrop, the paper discusses nature, features, and two facets of cognition; “recognition” and “conceptualization”. It critically examines Buddhist arguments and methods for cognizing objects of the world. The paper concludes that the arguments of the Nyāya School on cognizing an object’s universal features for its identity are not convincing, and hence not justifiable. In contrast, Buddhism’s view of cognizing objects through their observable features is reasonable and justifiable.