The Confucian Conception of Self: Collectivist or Relational?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4312/as.2026.14.1.89-102Keywords:
comparative philosophy, Confucianism, relational self, Ren (仁), self-cultivationAbstract
In this paper, I clarify the Confucian conception of self by distinguishing it from common misrepresentations, most notably its conflation with collectivism, as critiqued by Jana Rošker. These distortions, arguably rooted in the application of inappropriate Western frameworks, portray the Confucian self as self-effacing and subordinate to society. Drawing on key sinological and philosophical work, including that of David Hall, Roger Ames, and Jana Rošker, I argue instead that the Confucian self is relational and processual: constituted through one’s roles and relationships, not erased by them. I develop this interpretation in two stages. First, I show through conceptual analysis how the Confucian self integrates individuality and interdependence by situating personhood in a shared awareness of social roles. Second, I analyse the Analects and Mencius to show how the ideal of ren (仁) embodies ethical self-cultivation as a dynamic, ongoing process. I conclude that the Confucian self is best seen as a shared or social self-consciousness of roles and relations.
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