The Concept of Self in Buddhism and Brahmanism: Some Remarks

Andrej ULE

doi:10.4312/as.2016.4.1.81-95

Authors

Andrej ULE Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4312/as.2016.4.1.81-95

Keywords:

Buddhism, Brahmanism, self, non-self, consciousness, knowledge

Abstract

I contrast briefly the Buddhist concept of Self as a process and a conditional reality with the concept of the substantial metaphysical concept of Self in Brahmanism and Hinduism. I present the criticism of the Buddhist thinkers, such as Nāgārjuna, who criticize any idea of the metaphysical Self. They deny the idea of the Self as its own being or as a possessor of its mental acts. However, they do not reject all sense of Self; they allow a pure process of knowledge (first of all, Self-knowledge) without a fixed subject or “owner” of knowledge. This idea is in a deep accord with some Chan stories and paradoxes of the Self and knowledge.

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