Fighting the Barbarians in the Macedonian Marshes in 391

Abstract

Chapters 48 and 49 of Book 4 in Zosimus’ New History present the Emperor Theodosius’ routing of the group of barbarians who had rebelled in 388, during Theodosius’ preparations for war against the usurper Magnus Maximus, and preyed on the population of Macedonia and Thessaly from their hiding-places in the Macedonian marshes until 391. According to Zosimus, they were defeated by Theodosius in the summer of 391 as he was returning from the West to Constantinople. The content of Zosimus’ report has raised the doubts of many modern historians, but despite the prevailing mistrust of his description of the battle, the course of events has never been treated in greater detail. The chief aim of the present paper is thus to examine the battle more closely, in connection with other known sources, and to weigh the extent to which Zosimus’ account may nevertheless reflect the actual events. Foregrounded are, above all, two basic questions: (1) Did Theodosius on his way back from the West in fact engage in a battle with those same barbarians who had been hiding in the Macedonian marshes since 388?; and (2) Does Zosimus’ report refer to a single event (i.e. merely to Theodosius’ skirmishes with the barbarians in the Macedonian marshes), or did Zosimus unwittingly confuse the information on two different battles (the battle in the Macedonian marshes and the later one at the Hebrus)? When the information provided by Zosimus in the abovementioned passages is complemented by the information from Pacatus’ 389 panegyric to the Emperor Theodosius, by the reports on the uprising of the Thessalonians in the spring of 390, and by the edict permitting self-defence against robbers, which was addressed to the inhabitants of all provinces on July 1, 391, the circumstances and course of the battle might be interpreted as follows: In 388, during Theodosius’ preparations for war against Magnus Maximus, a group of the barbarians who had joined Theodosius rebelled because of insufficient provisions, seeking refuge in the marshes west of Thessalonica. It was more than three years before Theodosius, returning from the West, conclusively defeated this barbarian group. The Roman units which were stationed nearby, under the command of Buterichus as the magister militum for Illyricum, were apparently incapable of defeating the hiding barbarians. This very incapacity may have been the prime cause for the dissatisfaction of the Thessalonians, who rebelled in the spring of 390 and lynched the hated Buterichus. The inefficacy of Buterichus’ soldiers led Theodosius, preparing for the final confrontation with the rebellious barbarians, to engage the Thracian troops led by commander Promotus in their stead. Most likely the original plan was for Theodosius’ and Promotus’ troops to strike jointly, but when the Emperor’s spies discovered the rebellious barbarians’ hiding place, Theodosius attacked prematurely, without waiting for Promotus’ reinforcements. On belatedly arriving at the scene of the battle, these reinforcements barely managed to salvage the well-nigh hopeless situation.